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Abstract
Software projects can often spiral out of control to
become runaway systems that far exceed
original budget and schedule projections.  The
behavior that underlies many runaway systems
can best be characterized as escalation of
commitment to a failing course of action. The
objectives of this study were to:  (1) understand
the extent to which IS projects are prone to
escalate, (2) compare the outcomes of projects
that escalate with those that do not, and (3) test
whether constructs associated with different
theories of escalation can be used to discriminate
between projects that escalate and those that do
not.  A survey was administered to IS audit and
control professionals and, to establish a baseline
for comparison, the survey was designed to
gather data on projects that did not escalate as
well as those that did escalate.
The results of our research suggest that between
30% and 40% of all IS projects exhibit some
degree of escalation.  Projects that escalated had
Keil et al./Software Project Escalation
632 MIS Quarterly Vol. 24 No. 4/December 2000
project outcomes that were significantly worse in
terms of perceived implementation performance
and perceived budget/schedule performance, as
compared to projects that did not escalate. Using
constructs from theories that have been used to
explain the escalation phenomenon, we were able
to test various logistic regression models for their
ability to discriminate between projects that
escalate and those that do not.  To construct our
models, we explored constructs derived from self-
justification theory, prospect theory, agency
theory, and approach avoidance theory.  While
constructs derived from all four theories were
significant in logistic regression models, the
completion effect construct derived from approach
avoidance theory provided the best classification
of projects, correctly classifying over 70% of both
escalated and non-escalated projects.
Keywords:  Software project management, esca-
lation, IS project failure
ISRL Categories:  EE, EE01, EE101, EE06,
EL0202
Introduction
The reported statistics on information systems (IS)
projects are bleak:  by most accounts at least one
in four projects ends in failure.  Entire books are
now available filled with cases of software project
failure (see, for example, Flowers 1996; Glass
1998, 1999).  In 1995, the Standish Group re-
ported the results of a study of over 8,000 soft-
ware development projects, revealing that only
16% were completed on time and on budget
(Johnson 1995).  Most of the remaining projects,
if they were completed at all, came in over budget
and behind schedule, with fewer functions and
features than originally specified.  Cost overruns
for these projects averaged nearly 200%.  Cases
in which software projects go wildly over budget or
drag on long past their originally scheduled
completion date have been labeled runaway
systems in the trade press (Mehler 1991;
Willbern 1989).  Like a runaway train, these are
projects that are hurtling out of control; difficult to
stop, yet in need of redirection or termination.
The behavior that underlies many runaway
systems resembles escalation of commitment to
a failing course of action (Brockner 1992), a
phenomenon that has been documented in the
management literature  and recently applied to the
domain of software project management
(Drummond 1996; Keil 1995; Keil et al. 1995a;
Newman and Sabherwal 1996).  Consider the
following example:
In 1992, Californias Department of
Social Services (DSS) began a project to
develop a Statewide Automated Child
Support System (SACSS). The develop-
ment work was contracted out to Lock-
heed Martin under a $75.5 million
contract and scheduled to be completed
by September 1995. Though the project
quickly became plagued by cost over-
runs, a flawed procurement process, and
political struggles, the states Department
of Information Technology continued the
project as though nothing was the matter
all the way up until 1997.  Finally, in April
1997, the California Assembly Informa-
tion Technology Committee issued its
oversight report on the project asking:
How bad does a particular project need
to become before the states information
technology czar considers termination?
Eventually, in November 1997, the
SACSS project was cancelled by John
Thomas Flynn, Californias chief informa-
tion officer, after more than five years of
work and direct expenditures of $100
million.  Final costs were estimated to be
as high as $345 million. (Newcombe
1998)
One purpose of this research study was to ascer-
tain the frequency of software project escalation
and the duration of escalation when it does occur.
Whether we should be terribly concerned about
cases such as the one just described depends
upon the frequency of such events.  There are
some who would argue that software runaways
are rare events in our field, but that when they do
occur they are highly visible (Glass 1997).  For
every case of project escalation, they would argue
that there are numerous cases of project success
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that go unnoticed.  From this perspective, cases of
software project escalation are seen as the
exception, rather than the rule.  If this perspective
is true, examples such as Californias SACSS
project should not be of great concern to either
researchers or practitioners.  However, a counter
view might suggest that escalation occurs far
more frequently than it makes the headlines, a
natural consequence of the fact that companies
and managers do not wish to advertise their
project failures.  Under this view, well-publicized
examples such as the one above may represent
the tip of the iceberg, in which case the problem of
project escalation deserves the attention of both
researchers and practitioners.  To date, only a
handful of case studies have been published on
software project escalation (Drummond 1996; Keil
1995; Newman and Sabherwal 1996).  Thus, there
is no solid information concerning the actual
frequency of this phenomenon or the impact that
it has on project outcomes.
A second purpose of the study was to determine
if escalation was associated with negative project
outcomes.  It is possible, for example, that escala-
tionwhile it may represent a waste of organiza-
tional resourcesleads to project outcomes that
are not significantly worse than the outcomes
observed among projects that do not escalate.  In
order to answer this question, though, one would
need access to a sample of both escalated and
non-escalated projects for comparison purposes.
Finally, knowing that some fraction of software
projects undergo escalation, it would be useful to
determine if central constructs from the most
common theories of escalation behavior can be
used to distinguish projects that escalate from
those that do not.  Such knowledge could poten-
tially be of great benefit not only to researchers,
but also to practitioners who must make resource
allocation decisions on such projects.  While
several theories have been put forth to explain
escalation behavior, there has been no attempt to
determine if the constructs associated with these
theories can be used to discriminate between
projects that escalate and those that do not.
Thus, the third objective of this study was to test
different models of escalation by operationalizing
specific constructs derived from different theories
of escalation.
To summarize, our study was designed to answer
three basic research questions:
1. What is the frequency and duration of
software project escalation?
2. How do projects that escalate differ from
projects that do not escalate in terms of
project performance?
3. Can constructs associated with different
theories of escalation be used to create
models capable of distinguishing between
projects that escalate and those that do not?
The first two questions are descriptive in nature
while the third question, which is our primary focus
here, is of a more theoretical nature.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four
sections.  First, we discuss the concept of esca-
lating commitment and its application to software
projects, focusing our literature review around four
theories that have been used to explain the
escalation phenomenon.  From each theory, we
derive one or more constructs that are later
operationalized in an attempt to determine if they
can be used to distinguish between projects that
escalate and those that do not.  Next, we describe
the approach used to address the above research
questions.  Finally, we present our findings and
conclude the paper with a short discussion of their
implications for research and practice.
Background and Literature
Review
Escalation occurs when troubled projects are con-
tinued instead of being abandoned or redirected.
Several researchers have applied the concept of
escalation to the domain of software project
management (Drummond 1996; Keil 1995; Keil et
al. 1995a; Newman and Sabherwal 1996).  While
escalation is most frequently thought of as a bad
thing, it should be noted that there may be cases
in which escalation is warranted (see, for example,
Keil and Flatto 1999).  In this paper, however, we
focus on cases in which escalation, as judged
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through the eyes of a trained professionalan IS
auditoris unwarranted.
Central to the concept of escalation is the notion
of negative project status (Brockner 1992).  In the
context of software project escalation, negative
project status refers to significant performance
problems in one or more of the following areas:
cost, schedule, functionality, or quality.  For a
variety of reasons, these performance problems
may or may not be visible to the key decision
maker responsible for the decision of whether or
not to continue the project.
Traditionally, escalation has been defined as
continued commitment to a previously chosen
course of action in spite of negative feedback
concerning the viability of that course of action.  In
order to have escalation under this definition, one
might reasonably infer that the decision maker
responsible for continuing a project must be aware
of the negative project status.  Within the escala-
tion literature, however, this point is not well
addressed and thus the definition of what consti-
tutes escalation is subject to some debate and
interpretation.  In this paper, we address this issue
by explicitly defining escalation in unambiguous
terms that can then be more easily operation-
alized in a field setting.
The definitional issue associated with escalation
is akin to the question:  If a tree falls in the forest
and nobody hears it fall, does it still make a
sound?  In some cases, negative project status
information is present, but may not be available to
those in a position to terminate or redirect the
project.  One reason for this is that individuals in
the organization may conceal negative information
from their superiors, thereby promoting the esca-
lation process through what has been referred to
as the mum effect.  In other cases, superiors are
aware of negative information but choose to
ignore it (or discount it heavily) due to certain
cognitive biases, thereby promoting escalation
through what has been referred to as the deaf
effect (Keil and Robey 1999).  Whether it results
from the mum effect or the deaf effect (or some
combination of the two), escalation can be said to
occur within an organization when there is a
presence of negative project status information
that fails to be processed appropriately, resulting
in continuation of what appears to be a failing
course of action.  Under this definition, it is not
necessary that the decision maker be aware of
negative project status.  In other words, escalation
can occur either because the project status
information is biased, or is not available, or
because it is not attended to and interpreted
correctly. 
Once escalation is recognized, the decision maker
can take steps to de-escalate a troubled project by
either terminating it or redirecting the project along
some new course of action (e.g., redefining the
project or breaking off a more manageable piece
of the project on which to focus).  Under this con-
ceptualization, redirection represents a form of de-
escalation in the sense that it constitutes a
reduction in commitment vis-à-vis the previously
chosen course of action.
Theories to Explain Escalation
Behavior
The escalation literature provides a solid theore-
tical base for explaining commitment to failing
courses of action and may, therefore, shed light
on runaway systems projects.  Within the escala-
tion literature, several different theories have been
proposed to explain the phenomenon including
self-justification theory (SJT), prospect theory
(PT), agency theory (AT), and approach avoid-
ance theory (AAT).  We focus on these particular
theories because they are among the most fre-
quently invoked theories used to explain
escalation.  
Self-Justification Theory
Grounded in Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive
dissonance, self-justification theory (SJT) posits
that individuals tend to escalate their commitment
to a course of action (and undergo the risk of
additional negative outcomes) in order to self-
justify prior behavior (Staw and Fox 1977).  SJT is
based on the notion that individuals seek to
rationalize their previous behavior...against a
perceived error in judgement" (Staw and Fox
1977, p. 432).  Under SJT, escalation behavior is
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seen as arising from a kind of retrospective
rationality whereby costs or losses that have
been incurred in the past are considered relevant
to decision making.  Under retrospective ration-
ality, the decision maker feels compelled to justify
his actions in order to prove to himself (psycho-
logical self-justification) and to others (social self-
justification) that he is competent and rational.
According to Whyte (1986, p. 313), it is this need
to demonstrate rationality which is seen to activate
behavior that runs counter to commonly accepted
notions of rationality.
Central to the concept of psychological self-
justification is the notion of personal responsibility
(Staw 1976).  Presumably, a decision maker with
a high degree of personal responsibility for a
previously chosen course of action will feel a
greater need to justify the initial resource alloca-
tion decision and will, therefore, be more likely to
engage in psychological self-justification (Brock-
ner 1992).  Using a role-playing methodology,
Staw measured the effect of personal responsi-
bility on subjects' willingness to allocate resources
between two divisions of a hypothetical corpora-
tion.  He found that subjects' allocation of
resources toward a previously chosen alternative
was greatest under conditions of high personal
responsibility (for the previous investment deci-
sion).  Staw's early work in this area represents
the first and most frequently cited article invoking
SJT to explain escalation behavior.
Since the mid-1970s when SJT was first pro-
posed, there has been a steady stream of
publications that have invoked or extended the
theory to explain certain aspects of escalating
commitment.  The resulting body of literature
associated with SJT now suggests that the
psychological processes that underlie the need for
self-justification can be reinforced by certain social
factors.  As Staw and Ross (1987, p. 55) observe,
one social determinant of commitment is the
desire not to lose face or credibility with others.
In other words, it is now believed that social
pressures can heighten self-justification, leading
to the need for social (or external) self-justification
of a prior course of action in order to save face.
It should be noted that there have been some
studies (e.g., Armstrong et al. 1993; Singer and
Singer 1985) that have failed to find escalation
when attempting to create conditions very similar
to Staws classic escalation experiment in which
self-justification theory was first postulated.  Thus,
in recent years researchers have advanced
alternative theories to explain the phenomenon
(Brockner 1992).
Prospect Theory
Whyte (1986) has suggested that prospect theory
may offer a better explanation for escalating
commitment than SJT.  Prospect theory (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman
1981), provides a framework for understanding
the cognitive biases that influence human decision
making under conditions of risk and uncertainty.
Prospect theory posits that individuals exhibit risk
averse or risk seeking behavior depending on how
a problem is framed.  Specifically, prospect theory
suggests that individuals will exhibit risk seeking
behavior in choosing between two negative
alternatives, especially when the choice is
between a sure lossthe initial loss on the
investmentand the possibility of a larger loss
combined with a chance to return to the reference
point (Whyte 1986).  In other words, someone
who has not yet come to terms with an earlier loss
is likely to adopt a negative frame of reference
and is, therefore, more likely to engage in risk
seeking behavior.
According to Whyte, the critical distinction
between SJT and prospect theory is the role
ascribed to personal responsibility in fostering
commitment.
An approach based on self-justification
theory would suggest that escalating
commitment should not occur without a
degree of culpability on the part of the
decision maker for the initial failed out-
comes.  A prospect theory based analy-
sis implies otherwise.  A tendency to-
wards entrapment should be observed
whenever future choices can reasonably
be framed as choices between losses, as
after a series of failures. Personal res-
ponsibility is not a prerequisite of such a
frame, although it may be a contributing
element.  (Whyte 1986, p. 319).
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Whyte has suggested that prospect theory could
explain the so-called sunk cost effect in which
decision makers exhibit a tendency to "throw good
money after bad."  In particular, he suggests that
sunk costs may influence decision makers to
adopt a negative frame, thereby promoting risk
seeking behavior which can be observed as
escalating commitment to a failing course of
action.
In a series of laboratory experiments, Garland and
his colleagues  (1990; Garland and Newport 1991)
have documented the influence of sunk costs on
decisions to abandon or continue a prior course of
action.  The results of these experiments were
judged to be consistent with a prospect theory
interpretation of escalation.  It should be noted,
however, that Garland and his colleagues did not
control for the effect of personal responsibility in
these experiments.
Agency Theory
Jensen and Meckling define the concept of an
agency relationship as a contract under which
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage
another person (the agent) to perform some
service on their behalf which involves delegating
some decision making authority to the agent
(1976, p. 308).  Under agency theory, goal incon-
gruency between principal and agent can create
a situation in which the agent acts to maximize his
or her own utility, rather than acting in the best
interests of the principal.  The concept of infor-
mation asymmetry is central to all principal-agent
modelsthe agent is assumed to have private
information to which the principal cannot cost-
lessly gain access (Baiman 1990, p. 343).
Finally, agents are generally presumed to be
work-averse or risk-averse (Baiman 1990).  The
combination of information asymmetry and the
agents work or risk aversion is what typically
allows self-interested behavior to emerge.
While various monitoring and bonding mech-
anisms can be used to reduce conflicts between
principals and agents, these mechanisms are
generally imperfect and costly to implement.3
Thus, one of the chief concerns of agency
theorists is the so-called agency problem that
arises when the goals of the principal and agent
conflict and when it is expensive or impractical for
the principal to monitor the behavior of the agent.
Agency relationships can exist between the
owners of a firm and its senior management, but
they can also exist between different levels within
a firms hierarchy.  The agency problem is quite
general and it exists in all organizations and in all
cooperative effortsat every level of management
in firms (Jensen and Meckling 1986, p. 218).  The
agency problem within a firms hierarchy is
exacerbated by the fact that the firms top
executives frequently hold a significant amount of
stock whereas those lower in the hierarchy may
hold little, if any, stock (Scholes 1991).  Motivated
by their own self-interest, agents will make
themselves better off by deviating from their
cooperative behavior which maximizes the firms
welfare (Baiman 1990, p. 342).
Harrison and Harrell (1993) have suggested
agency theory as an alternative theoretical
perspective from which to view the phenomenon
of escalating commitment.  They explain the
application of agency theory to the problem of
escalation as follows:
When an agent has private information
about the projected future performance of
a project, the principal is unable to com-
pletely monitor the agent's actions, and
information asymmetry prevails.  Here,
the potential for goal conflict between the
principal and agent arises.  If, for
instance, an agent's reputation was hurt
by a decision to discontinue a project he
or she had started, the event would
negatively affect the agent's future career
opportunities, thus providing an incentive
to shirk.  In this situation, agents are
3Agency costs result from: (1) the monitoring
expenditures by the principal designed to limit the
aberrant activities of the agent, (2) the bonding
expenditures by the agent designed to guarantee that
he will not take certain actions which would harm the
principal or to insure that the principal will be
compensated if he does take such actions, and (3) the
residual loss which refers to the the dollar equivalent of
the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal
when the agent makes decisions that do not maximize
the principles welfare (Jensen and Meckling 1986, p.
217).
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expected to reach decisions that maxi-
mize their self-interest at the expense of
the principal's interests.  (Harrison and
Harrell 1993, pp. 636-637).
In a laboratory experiment, Harrison and Harrell
demonstrated that subjects were more likely to
continue with a questionable project when they
were manipulated to believe that they possessed
private information about the projects prospects
for success and that a decision to discontinue a
project would damage their reputation and be
potentially harmful to their career.  These findings
were interpreted to be consistent with an agency
theory view of escalation.  Subsequent studies
have yielded similar results (Harrell and Harrison
1994; Tuttle et al. 1997).
Harrison and Harrells application of agency
theory to the problem of escalating commitment to
a failing course of action appears to be theo-
retically sound and may be of particular salience
in a software project management context.  Logi-
cally, a risk averse agent in this context (e.g., the
software project manager) whose actions are not
observable will report good news, but will only
report bad news if necessary, since bad news is
more likely to get the agent fired than good news.
Any bad news that is reported could be the result
of either bad luck or shirking on the part of the
agent.  A rational executive would not fire a
person who achieved a negative result because of
chance alone.  However, because of imperfect
monitoring, the principal cannot tell the difference
between lack of effort on the part of the agent and
bad luck.  Thus, the agency problem that pro-
motes escalation behavior will exist within organi-
zations because the principle cannot observe with
certainty the actions and work effort of the agent.
To summarize, the source of the goal incon-
gruency between principle and agent arises from
the fact that the agent can get fired or suffer other
negative impacts to his/her reputation or career
simply for delivering bad news.  The agency prob-
lem described here may be quite likely to occur in
a software project context because such projects
are notoriously difficult to monitor and control
(DeMarco 1982).  What is more, the intangible, or
invisible, nature of software itself  (Abdel-Hamid
and Madnick 1991) contributes to the problems of
incomplete contracting and imperfect monitoring
which give rise to the agency problem.
Approach Avoidance Theory 
Escalation situations can be viewed as instances
of approach avoidance conflict (Rubin and
Brockner 1975).  Under approach avoidance
theory, escalation is conceptualized as a behavior
that results when driving forces that encourage
persistence seem to outweigh restraining forces
that encourage abandonment (Brockner and
Rubin 1985).  These competing forces create a
conflict over whether to continue or withdraw
(Mann 1996).  According to approach avoidance
theory, in escalation situations, the cost of persis-
tence (a restraining force) is often overshadowed
by one or more driving forces such as:  (1) the
size of the reward for goal attainment, (2) the cost
of withdrawal, or (3) the proximity to the goal.
Derived from approach avoidance theory, the
completion effect reflects the notion that the
motivation to achieve a goal increases as an
individual gets closer to that goal (Conlon and
Garland 1993, p. 403).  The completion effect is
consistent with psychological research suggesting
that the desire to achieve task closure, or
completion, can have a significant influence on
behavior (Katz and Kahn 1966).  This view is also
consistent with early work on escalation
conducted by Brockner et al. (1979, p. 194), who
observed that an individuals motivation for pur-
suing a course of action may shift over time due
in part to the presumed increased proximity to the
goal.  Results from a series of experiments
appear to provide support for the completion effect
(Conlon and Garland 1993; Garland and Conlon
1998).  Conlon and Garland suggest that the
motivation to complete a task that has already
been started and is perceived to be near
completion can, in itself, bring about escalation
behavior through a form of goal substitution.
Conlon and Garland go so far as to suggest that
escalation behavior and what has been previously
characterized as the sunk cost effect may be
motivated by what they term the completion effect.
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Noting that there may be a strong positive
correlation between sunk costs and project
completion in many instances, Conlon and
Garland (p. 403) point out that they are two
theoretically different concepts.  Mann (1996)
suggests that goal proximity, or the completion
effect, represents a pull on the individual
because it relates to benefits to be received in the
future (p. 46).  The sunk cost effect, which is
grounded in prospect theory, is more concerned
with how past behavior pushes the individual to
proceed (Mann 1996, p. 46).
Prior empirical work by Conlon and Garland
suggests that the completion effect (associated
with approach avoidance theory) may have a
more pronounced impact on escalation behavior
than does the sunk cost effect (associated with
prospect theory).  Work by Keil et al. (1995b),
however, suggests the opposite.  Because this
matter remains unresolved in the literature, we
included both constructs in our research.
Another rationale for including the completion
effect is that it may be particularly germane to
software projects, which frequently exhibit the so-
called 90% complete syndrome (Abdel-Hamid
1988; DeMarco 1982).  This syndrome refers to
the tendency for estimates of work completed to
increase steadily until a plateau of 90% is
reached.  Thereafter, programmer estimates of
the fraction of work completed increase very
slowly.  In some cases, inaccurate estimation
leads to situations in which software projects are
reported to be 90% complete for half of the entire
duration of the project, an obvious impossibility
(Brooks 1975).  This syndrome may promote
escalation behavior by creating the impression
that project completion is close at hand, even
when it is not.  Measuring the completion level of
any medium to large sized software project is
extremely difficult and, therefore, one of the
reasons for escalation is lack of information about
the true status of the project, leading to a false
perception that the project is close to completion.
Summarizing the Theories and the
Constructs Derived
Table 1 compares the four theories just discussed
and indicates the key constructs that were derived
from each of these theories.  We shall return to
these later in the paper when we discuss the
approach taken for model building.
Research Method
In order to address our research questions, a
cross-sectional survey of information systems
audit and control professionals was used to collect
information on both escalated projects and non-
escalated projects.  IS auditors were chosen for
study because of their role in monitoring software
projects. Auditors are a preferred source of
information about troubled software projects
because they are likely to be more objective than
IS managers or project team members.  Project
managers or project sponsors, for example, would
likely be reluctant to discuss escalation on
projects with which they have been associated.
Moreover, any information that they might provide
would be subject to possible bias. 
The sampling design used in this study was to
select a sample of Information Systems Audit and
Control Association (ISACA) members in the U.S.
who would be most likely to be involved in
information systems development.  Toward this
end, the study was focused on internal and
external IS auditors.  An internal auditor is one
that is employed by the firm (usually reporting to
the audit department).  An external auditor is one
that is hired by firms as an outside consultant to
perform certain auditing tasks.  Using the ISACA
membership database, which contains self-
reported job category information, we were able to
limit the pool of potential participants to those
individuals who were likely to have the greatest
exposure to information systems development
projects.  This pool of individualsrepresenting all
U.S. ISACA members who described themselves
as an IS Audit Manager, IS Auditor, Internal
Auditor, or External Auditorincluded appro-
ximately 2,500 ISACA members in the U.S.
The survey instrument was designed to gather
data concerning the frequency and magnitude of
escalation as well as the constructs associated
with each of the four theories.  A mail survey,
based on Dillmans (1978) total design method,
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Table 1.  Four Theories of Escalation and the Key Constructs
Derived from Each Theory
Theory How the Theory Explains Escalation
Key Construct(s) Derived
from the Theorya
Self-
justification
theory
(SJT).
Managers continue to commit resources to a failing
course of action in order to self-justify the correctness
of an earlier decision to pursue a particular course of
action.  The need to self-justify is both psychological
and social in nature.  Social pressures are hypothe-
sized to heighten the need to self-justify, often leading
to behaviors that are designed to save face.
 Psychological self-
justification
 Social self-justification
Prospect
theory (PT).
Managers commit resources to a failing course of
action because the decision is framed as a choice
between losses which leads to risk seeking behavior. 
Sunk costs are believed to invoke a choice between
losses which induces escalation behavior.
 Sunk cost effect
Agency
theory (AT).
Managers commit resources to a failing course of
action because it is in their best interest to do so due to
goal incongruency between the manager and his/her
superior(s) and a condition of information asymmetry.
 Goal incongruency
 Information asymmetry
Approach
avoidance
theory
(AAT)
Managers commit resources to a failing project
because the forces encouraging them to do so (driving
forces) are stronger than those forces which suggest
discontinuation (restraining forces).  One of the key
driving forces that can encourage escalation is the
proximity to the goal, or what is sometimes labeled the
completion effect.
 Completion effect
aThe construct(s) derived from each theory were chosen because they represented key features of the theory and
because the literature has portrayed these particular constructs as being salient in the context of escalation.  We make
no claim to have fully operationalized each theory.
was chosen as the most cost-effective means of
collecting data on a large number of projects
(Mann 1996).  In order to provide a control group
for comparison purposes, two different versions of
the survey instrument were developed: one
designed to gather information on cases of soft-
ware project escalation and the other designed to
gather information on projects that did not esca-
late.  The purpose of the latter version of the
survey was to provide a reference point, or base-
line, to determine whether the outcomes asso-
ciated with projects that escalate were significantly
different from the outcomes associated with pro-
jects that did not escalate.  This baseline sample
also allowed us to test various models aimed at
distinguishing escalated from non-escalated
projects using constructs derived from different
theories of escalation behavior.
Participants who received the escalation survey
were asked to select a project with which they
were familiar that fit the definition of project
escalation provided on the survey form (see
Appendix A).  Thus, for the purposes of this parti-
cular study, we limited ourselves to cases of
escalation that were defined as unwarranted by a
professional IS auditor.  The survey was designed
to allow the auditor to assess the presence or
absence of certain attitudes or behaviors exhibited
by the key decision maker responsible for the
decision to continue the project (see Appendix B).
Under our conceptualization of escalation given
earlier, it was not essential that the decision
maker(s) responsible for continuation be aware of
negative information.  However, it was necessary
to establish the presence of negative information
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within the organization.  In our survey design, a
trained professionalnamely an IS auditor
made the determination that negative information
existed within the organization by identifying a
troubled project which continued to received
resources even though s/he thought that the
project should have been discontinued or
redirected.4
Participants who received the non-escalation
version of the survey were asked to select a com-
pleted project that progressed smoothly enough
that the respondent never thought it should be
discontinued or redirected. It is important to note
that the two different versions of the survey were
identical except for the instructions regarding what
type of project to select, thus allowing the non-
escalation survey group to serve as a baseline for
comparison purposes.  Appendix A shows the
instructions that the respondents received to help
them select either an escalated or non-escalated
project.
The survey was refined successively through two
rounds of pre-testing, followed by a pilot study in
which both versions of the survey were adminis-
tered to a sample of approximately 300 IS audit
and control professionals (for details, see Mann
1996).  The full-scale administration involved
2,231 ISACA members and represented those
individuals who met one of the four job-type
categories described earlier and who had not
participated in either the pre-test or pilot phases of
the study.  For the full-scale administration of the
survey, a decision was made to split the sample
70:30 so that 70% of the participants would
receive the escalation version of the survey and
30% would receive the non-escalation version of
the survey.  This was done to maximize the size of
the escalation sub-sample while insuring an ade-
quate number of projects in the comparison group.
In all cases, the decision was random as to
whether a participant received an escalation or a
non-escalation survey.
Construct Operationalization
In this section, we describe how we operationa-
lized each of our constructs.  First, the measure-
ment items used to assess escalation frequency
are described, and then the measures used to
assess project performance are introduced.  Next,
we discuss the operationalization of the constructs
derived from the different theories of escalation. 
Escalation Frequency
A series of three measurement items were
designed to obtain an estimate of escalation
frequency.  At the beginning of this series of
questions, escalation was clearly defined for the
respondent as troubled projects which continued
to receive resources even though you thought the
project should have been discontinued or
redirected.  One item asked: Of the last five
projects with which you have been associated...
how many were cases of project escalation?  A
second item asked:  Of all the projects with which
you have been associated during your years as an
information systems control professional, what
percentage would you classify as cases of project
escalation?  Finally, as an additional means of
triangulation, a third item asked:  In your judg-
ment what percentage of all IS development
projects are cases of project escalation? 
Project Performance
Two different measures of project performance
were developed: (1) a categorical measure
designed to capture whether the system was ever
successfully completed and if so, whether it was
successfully implemented and used within the
organization, and (2) whether the project was
perceived as being delivered on schedule and
within budget.  The first we call perceived imple-
mentation performance and the second we shall
refer to as perceived budget/schedule perfor-
mance.
To assess perceived implementation perfor-
mance, we developed a categorical measurement
item representing different project outcomes (for
details, see Mann 1996).  If a subject felt that the
outcome of the project did not fit into one of our
categories, s/he was encouraged to provide an
4We adopted a conservative position and dropped seven
cases, as the auditor indicated that no one else in the
organization believed these project were in trouble.  The
set of projects that we consider as escalated are those
that the auditor believed were in trouble and their
assessment of the project's troubled state was also
triangulated by at least a few organizational members.
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alternative description of the projects outcome.
These alternative descriptions were then content
analyzed and used to augment the original
categorization scheme.  To measure perceived
budget/schedule performance, each respondent
was asked to indicate whether the project they
reported on went over budget or beyond schedule
and, if so, by what percentage.  
We now turn to the operationalization of the
constructs derived from different theories that
have been used to explain escalation.  To
increase the reliability of the survey instrument,
multiple measurement items were developed for
each of these constructs.  The actual measure-
ment items are shown in Appendix B.
Psychological Self-Justification Construct
Since psychological self-justification cannot be
assessed directly (as this would require access to
the subconscious mind of the key decision maker
responsible for escalation), we operationalized
this construct by tapping into observable
behaviors that could serve as reliable indicators of
the psychological need to self-justify.  Staw and
Ross (1987, p. 52) observe that one of the
psychological mechanisms that may underlie self-
justification is the concept of self-inference, which
implies that individuals examine their own
behavior in its social context so as to infer per-
sonal values and preferences from prior actions.
Thus, individuals are likely to become committed
to a course of action when their prior investments
and actions supporting a project have been
explicit, freely chosen, visible to others, irrevo-
cable, repeated, and important (Staw and Ross
1987, p. 52).  In order to tap into this notion, one
of our items (PSJ_1) was designed to measure
the extent to which the key decision maker
repeatedly expressed support for a project.  This
item would presumably pick up whether the
decision maker had shown repeated signs of
support that were visible to others in the organi-
zation.
The need to engage in psychological self-
justification is greatest under a condition of high
personal responsibility.  One of the principle ways
in which personal responsibility has been opera-
tionalized in previous experiments involving SJT
has been to manipulate subjects into believing
that they were personally responsible for having
initiated some course of action.  Of course, a
sense of personal responsibility can also be
expected to develop over time, given extensive
involvement with a project.  As Staw and Ross
(1987, p. 51) suggest, the level of involvement
that an actor has in a project represents a factor
that can foster ego-defensiveness, and hence
psychological self-justification.  Thus, one of our
measurement items used to assess the need for
psychological self-justification (PSJ_2) was
designed to measure the extent to which the key
decision maker either initiated the project or was
extensively involved with it.
Of course, other factors can cause a decision
maker to engage in psychological self-justification.
Emotional attachment to a failing project, for
example, is one indicator of over-commitment
(Keil 1995).  When the key decision maker
becomes emotionally attached and, therefore,
over-committed to a project, he/she is more likely
to engage in psychological self-justification.
Hence, we developed a third measurement item
(PSJ_3) to tap into this aspect of the need for
psychological self-justification.
Social Self-Justification Construct
Decision makers may escalate their commitment
to a failing course of action not only because they
do not want to admit to themselves that they made
a mistake, but also because they may be
especially hesitant to expose their errors to
others (Staw and Ross 1987, p. 55).  This
concept of face-saving has been called social (or
external) self-justification in the escalation
literature.  If abandoning a project would make the
key decision maker look bad to others, this would
suggest a high need for social self-justification.
Thus, one of our measurement items (SSJ_1) was
designed to tap into this notion.
Closely related to the concept of social self-
justification is the notion of external binding,
whereby peoples social identity can become
bound or frozen by their actions (Staw and Ross
1987, p. 56).  In escalation situations, external
binding is likely to occur when the key decision
maker becomes so closely identified with a project
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that it is viewed as his/her baby.  An extreme
instance of this is when a course of action
becomes so closely identified with an individual
that it carrys his/her name (e.g., Reaganomics).
This concept of external binding forms the basis
for our second measurement item (SSJ_2)
designed to tap into the social self-justification
construct.
Sunk Cost Effect Construct
The sunk cost effect construct, derived from
prospect theory, was operationalized by capturing
the extent to which the key decision maker
referred to past investments as a reason for
project continuation.  References to past invest-
ments in a project, when offered as a rationale for
continuation, can be taken as evidence of the
sunk cost effect, and this was the basis for one of
our measurement items (SC_1).  Similarly, the
decision maker may sometimes justify continua-
tion by exhibiting an attitude that there is too much
invested to quit, which formed the basis for our
second measurement item (SC_2).  When this is
the case, it is strongly suggestive that the sunk
cost effect is operative.
Our operationalization is consistent with docu-
mented cases involving the sunk cost effect that
have been cited in the literature.  Arkes and
Blumer (1985), for example, describe the
TennesseeTombigbee Waterway Project, which
was scheduled for Congressional review in 1981.
One senator, who was a proponent of the project,
was quoted as saying:  To terminate a project in
which $1.1 billion has been invested represents
an unconscionable mishandling of taxpayers
dollars (Arkes and Blumer 1985, p. 124).  Our
operationalization of the sunk cost effect construct
is also consistent with previous research that has
employed content analysis to detect phrases that
people use to express the notion of sunk cost as
a rationale for continuing a troubled project (Keil et
al. 1995b).  Keil et al. (1995b) have noted that
remarks such as too much money has already
been invested to back out of the project now are
typical of the way in which people express sunk
cost as a rationale for continuation.
Goal Incongruency Construct
Goal incongruency is one of two constructs that
were derived from agency theory and used in this
study.  In our conceptualization, the goal incon-
gruency between principal and agent arises
because of powerful forces that inhibit the primary
decision maker from transmitting bad news.  One
such force is the negative impact that transmitting
bad news can have on the agents reputation.
Three measurement items were created to
operationalize this construct within the context of
our study.
As Kanodia et al. (1989) suggest, when managers
discontinue a failing project or reveal negative
information about a failing project, they reveal
information that damages their reputations and
can have an adverse effect on future job
opportunities.  Consistent with this line of rea-
soning, in the context of information systems
projects, goal incongruency can be said to exist
within an organizational hierarchy when the
primary decision maker on a project (i.e., the
agent(s)) acts out of self-interest and continues to
plow resources into a failing course of action,
instead of acting in the interests of the
organization and either redirecting or terminating
a failing project.  One of our measurement items
for goal inconguency (GI_1) was, therefore,
designed to tap into this notion by asking the
auditor to share his/her perspective on this point.
It should be noted that in our operationalization of
agency theory, the principal would be someone
higher in the organizational hierarchy than the
primary decision maker on the project.
In a more direct attempt to tap into the idea that
the agent may suffer negative career conse-
quences for reporting bad news, we created two
additional items.  One item was designed to mea-
sure whether, in the auditors view, the primary
decision maker operated in an environment where
bad news gets you killed (GI_2).  The third item
(GI_3) was designed to measure the auditors
perception of whether the primary decision maker
operated in an organizational climate where
association with an unsuccessful project would
have an adverse effect on chances for advance-
ment in the organization.
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Table 2.  Survey Response Rates for the Two Different Versions of the Survey
Survey Type No. distributed No. returned Response rate
Escalation survey 1,549 422 27%
Non-escalation (control) survey 682 157 23%
Total 2,231 579 26%
Information Asymmetry Construct
Information asymmetry is the second construct
that was derived from agency theory and used in
this study.  We created three measurement items
designed to assess the extent to which the
agent(s) could create or exploit a condition of
information asymmetry between themselves and
the principal(s).  The first measurement item
(IA_1) asked the auditor whether the primary
decision maker concealed negative information
from top management.  Recognizing that informa-
tion asymmetry can result not only from conceal-
ment, but also from distortion of information as it
is passed up the hierarchy, we created two
additional items to capture this notion.  The first
measured the auditors perceptions of whether the
primary decision maker distorted negative infor-
mation when reporting to upper management
(IA_2).  The second measured the auditors
perceptions of whether the primary decision
maker put a positive spin on any negative project
information when reporting to upper management
(IA_3).
Completion Effect Construct
In this research, we wanted to investigate goal
proximityor the completion effect as it is
sometimes calledbecause it is one of the central
constructs associated with approach avoidance
theory and because there is some debate
regarding the relative impact of sunk cost and
completion effects in cases involving escalation.
The completion effect construct was opera-
tionalized by creating two measures designed to
assess the extent to which goal proximity, and the
need for completion, may have influenced the
decision to continue.  One measure (C_1) cap-
tured the extent to which the key decision maker
exhibited the attitude we have come too far to
quit now as a rationale for continuing the project.
The second measure (C_2) captured the extent to
which the key decision-maker(s) exhibited the
attitude we are so close to the end of the project,
we should keep going.  Such references to the
proximity of achieving a certain goal, when offered
as a rationale for continuation, can be taken as
evidence of the completion effect.
Our operationalization of the completion effect
construct is also consistent with previous research
that has employed content analysis to detect
phrases that people use to express the completion
effect as a rationale for continuing a troubled
project (Keil et al. 1995b).  Keil et al. (1995b) have
noted that remarks such as once you start
something, finish it are typical of the way in which
people express the completion effect as a
rationale for continuation.
Response Rate and Tests for
Non-response Bias
Table 2 summarizes the response rates for the
two different versions of the survey.  In total, 579
surveys were returned, yielding a 26% overall
response rate.
Non-response bias can be a significant hindrance
in the interpretation of results from a mail survey.
One method of testing for non-response bias is to
compare attributes of the survey respondents with
attributes of all individuals receiving the survey.  In
this study, the state of residence was available for
every subject.  By assigning each state to a region
and then comparing the regional frequencies of
respondents to regional frequencies of the full
mailing list, we were able to test for non-response
bias.  Observed frequencies of the respondents
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Table 3.  Regional Non-Response Bias Results
Region Expected Observed
Northeast 228 226
Southeast 73 82
N. Central 92 91
S. Central 85 76
Mountain 25 27
Pacific 71 70
Total Chi-Square 2.23 (p-value > 0.816)
were compared with expected frequencies based
on the full mailing list.  As shown in Table 3, the
chi-square test indicated there was no significant
difference between the respondents and the full
mailing list on region.  
As a further test for non-response bias, the
surveys received were grouped into two waves
based on the date returned, with later respondents
serving as a surrogate for non-respondents
(Babbie 1973).  The first wave included those
surveys received within two weeks of the initial
mailing (i.e., before the follow-up mailing could
have been received and acted on) and the second
wave included those received after the follow-up
mailing.  Using this approach, it was possible to
determine whether later respondents were signi-
ficantly different from earlier respondents on such
demographic variables as  experience, industry
category, number of employees, and number of IS
employees.  Using non-parametric statistical tests
(e.g., Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis), there
was no discernible difference between the two
waves on any of the above variables.  While the
above tests cannot guarantee the absence of any
non-response bias, they suggest that the respon-
dents are representative of the population
surveyed.
Respondent Demographics
A total of 72% of our respondents indicated that
they were either an IS auditor or IS audit manager.
The remaining respondents identified themselves
either as external auditors (12%) or specified a
different audit-related title (16%).  Survey respon-
dents had an average of 8.7 years of experience
as an information systems audit and control
professional.
The respondents represented organizations
varying in size from 10,000 or more employees
(36%) to fewer than 100 employees (1%).  Most
respondents represented medium to large organi-
zations with 1,000 or more employees (83%).  Of
the respondents, 40% worked for organizations in
the financial services industry, although a wide
variety of other sectors were also represented,
including government (15%), manufacturing
(13%), utilities (6%), trade (6%), health care (4%),
transportation (2%), education (2%), and other
(12%).
With respect to the projects they reported on,
nearly half of the subjects indicated that they had
either served as the project manager (5%), as a
member of the development team (11%), or had
been responsible for evaluating the project on a
regular basis (32%).  Approximately half of the
respondents indicated that they became asso-
ciated at a very early stage with the projects they
reported on, either during planning (24%) or
requirements analysis (24%).
Reliability Assessment
Constructs derived from the four theories of
escalation involved multiple measurement  items
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Table 4.  Level of Conformity Associated with Measurement Items
Construct
# of
Items
Complete
Conformity
n* = (%)
Partial
Conformity
n = (%)
No Conformity
n =  (%)
Completion Effect 2 230  (75.4)  75 (24.6)
Sunk Cost Effect 2 235  (78.6)  64 (21.4)
Goal Congruency 3 151  (53.5) 131 (46.5) 
Information Asymmetry 3 179  (66.8) 89 (33.2) 
Social Self-Justification 2 189  (63.0)  111 (37.0)
Psychological Self-
Justification
3 110  (37.5) 183 (62.5) 
*Note:  The number of cases associated with each scale differs due to missing values.
that were assessed for reliability.  Three of the six
constructs were measured using scales with two
dichotomous measurement items, whereas the
other three constructs were measured using
scales with three dichotomous measurement
items.  As all of our measurement items were
dichotomous, standard measures of reliability,
such as Cronbach's alpha, could not be used.
Instead, we assessed the degree to which items
associated with a given scale exhibited complete
conformity, partial conformity, or no conformity.
Complete conformity occurs when coded
responses are identical for all items associated
with a scale.  Partial conformity occurs in three-
item scales when the coded response on one item
is different from the coded response on the other
two items.  Non-conformity occurs in two-item
scales when the coded response on one item is
different from the coded response on the other
item.  By definition, two-item scales cannot exhibit
partial conformity and three-item scales cannot
exhibit non-conformity.  Table 4 summarizes the
level of conformity associated with each of the
measurement scales.
For five of the six scales, the level of complete
conformity is substantially greater than the level of
partial conformity or no conformity.  Note that
psychological self-justification is the only scale
where the number of cases with partial conformity
is greater than the number of cases with complete
conformity.  One measurement item, namely
PSJ_3 (emotional attachment) as shown in
Appendix B, contributed to a substantial portion of
the observed partial conformity for the psycho-
logical self-justification construct.  Accordingly, we
deleted this item and used a two-item measure for
the psychological self-justification construct.  
Convergent and Discriminant 
Validity
The item-to-construct correlations were first com-
puted to examine convergent and discriminant
validity (Table 5).  All measurement items, with the
exception of PSJ_1 (repeatedly expressed sup-
port), had correlation coefficients greater than .73
with the construct they were designed to measure.
This item had a moderate correlation of .55 with
the self-justification construct.  We retained PSJ_1
as part of the two-item psychological self-justi-
fication construct because this correlation was still
moderate.
Only one of the items had a very high correlation
with a construct other than the one that it was
intended to measure.  Specifically, SC_2 ("too
much invested to quit"), which is one of the two
items designed to measure sunk cost effect, also
has a correlation of .74 with completion effect.
Accordingly, this item was dropped as a measure-
ment item, and the sunk cost effect construct was
assessed using a one-item measure.
To further assess the discriminant validity of our
measures, we examined the inter-construct
correlation matrix (Table 6).
Table 5.  Item-to-Construct Correlations*
Constructs
Item
Measuresa
Constructs
Completion
Effect
Sunk Cost
Effect
Goal
Incongruency
Information
Asymmetry
Social Self-
Justification
Psychological
Self-Justification
Completion
Effect
C_1 .87 .66 .40 .31 .37 .19
C_2 .87 .55 .33 .32 .25 .11
Sunk Cost Effect SC_1 .51 .88 .38 .27 .28 .01
SC_2 .74 .88 .39 .34 .39 .11
Goal
Incongruency
GI_1 .40 .42 .77 .58 .45 .12
GI_2 .30 .31 .79 .59 .39 .03
GI_3 .26 .25 .73 .35 .27 .10
Information
Asymmetry
IA_1 .30 .27 .57 .85 .39 .03
IA_2 .35 .34 .62 .89 .45 .17
IA_3 .29 .29 .48 .79 .40 .12
Social Self-
Justification
SSJ_1 .37 .39 .45 .42 .82 .22
SSJ_2 .20 .24 .36 .39 .83 .25
Psychological
Self-Justification
PSJ_1 .09 .05 .07 .05 .18 .55
PSJ_2 .03 .06 .12 .10 .27 .84
*The actual scale items used are shown in Appendix 2.  Shaded cells in this table represent insignificant correlations (p > .05).
Table 6.  Inter-construct Bivariate Correlations*
Constructs1
Completion
Effect
Sunk Cost
Effect
Goal
Incongruency
Information
Asymmetry
Social Self-
Justification
Psychological Self-
Justification
Completion Effect 1
Sunk Cost Effect .51 1
Goal Incongruency .43 .38 1
Information Asymmetry .37 .27 .67 1
Social Self-Justification .35 .28 .48 .50 1
Psychological 
Self-Justification
.09 .01 .09 .09 .28 1
*p > .05 for the shaded cells, which represent insignificant correlations.
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Ghiselli et al. (1981) suggest that correlations
greater than 0.80 suggest extreme cases of multi-
collinearity.  No such cases of extreme multicol-
linearity were detected.  The two constructs de-
rived from agency theory (goal incongruency and
information asymmetry) have a high correlation.
However, as these constructs tap into two different
sets of issues suggested by agency theory, we
retained them as two separate variables in our
subsequent analysis.  
After establishing the reliability and validity of our
measurement items, aggregate measures were
computed by summing responses to scale items
and then dividing by the number of items.  Since
each item was measured on a dichtomous scale
(1 if the item was present in the project and 0 if it
was not), the values of each construct repre-
sented a continuum that varied from 0 (not
present) to 1 (present). 
Results and Discussion
This section presents the major findings from our
study organized around the three research ques-
tions we sought to address.
Frequency and Duration of
Software Project Escalation
Our first research question was aimed at gaining
a better understanding of the frequency and
duration of project escalation.  In short, we were
interested in knowing how frequently escalation
occurs and how long it lasts when it does occur.
Duration of escalation refers to how long projects
are allowed to continue after the point at which an
IS auditor believes they should have been termi-
nated or redirected.
The survey results provide convincing indications
that project escalation is a common problem.  To
obtain as accurate an estimate as possible con-
cerning the frequency of escalation, we examined
a restricted view of the data set, which included
only those respondents who had experience with
at least five projects coupled with three or more
years of relevant job experience (n = 361).
Respondents included in this analysis had an
average of 10.5 years of work experience as an IS
audit and control professional.  
When asked how many of the last five projects
they had been associated with were cases of
project escalation, 81% of the respondents
indicated that one or more of their last five
projects involved escalation.  The mean response
was 1.92, suggesting that escalation occurs (on
average) in 38% of all software projects.  When
asked directly what percentage of all the projects
with which you have been associated during your
years as an information systems control profes-
sional...would you classify as cases of project
escalation?, the mean response was 0.304.
When asked: In your judgment what percentage
of all IS development projects are cases of project
escalation?, the mean response was 0.383.  It is
interesting to note that all three of the escalation
frequency measures yielded similar results.  The
reliability between these items was extremely high
(.92).  Taken together, the three measures des-
cribed above provide a remarkably consistent view
of how frequently IT project escalation occurs; the
data strongly suggest that 30% to 40% of all IT
projects involve some degree of project
escalation.
By capturing key dates in the escalation survey
(i.e., the month/year when the project began to
escalate, and the month/year when the project
was either terminated or redirected), it was pos-
sible to calculate the duration of escalation (in
months).  Escalation time among the projects
surveyed ranged from one month to 255 months
(i.e., 21 years!).  Nearly 75% of the projects esca-
lated for two years or less.  Among projects that
escalated, the average escalation time was 21
months with half of the projects escalating for 15
or more months.
Together, these findings strongly suggest that
escalation is a frequently occurring problem and
that both researchers and managers should be
concerned about it.  The findings reported here
appear to contrast sharply with the views of some
practitioners, who contend that software project
runaways are rare events (Glass 1997).
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Table 7.  Perceived Implementation Performance
Category
Escalated
Projects
Non-Escalated
Projects
Abandoned Before Completion
Never Implemented
Partially Completed
Less than Successful
Withdrawn After Implementation
Completed and Successful
Other
(N=243)
44 (18%)
13 (  5%)
56 (23%)
44 (18%)
20 (  8%)
55 (23%)
11 (  5%)
(N=91)
4 (4%)
2 (4%)
2 (2%)
4 (4%)
2 (2%)
76 (84%)
1 (1%)
Table 8.  Perceived Budget/Schedule Performance
Type of Project
Average % Beyond
Budget Target
Average % Beyond 
Schedule Target
Escalated 156% 133%
Non-Escalated 18% 22%
T-Test p < .001 p < .001
Comparison of Escalated vs. Non-
escalated Project Performance
Our second research question was aimed at
understanding whether projects that escalate
differ significantly from projects that do not
escalate in terms of project performance.  Using
measures for perceived implementation perfor-
mance and perceived budget/schedule perfor-
mance, we found significant differences between
projects that escalated and those that did not.
Perceived Implementation Performance
For classification purposes, each project was
assigned to a single outcome category (i.e., the
one that best seemed to fit the respondents
opinion regarding the outcome of the project).
The classification scheme used here for perceived
implementation performance is categorical in
nature and is not meant to represent a smooth
continuum from failure to success.  The perceived
implementation performance categories and the
frequency with which projects were assigned to
them are shown in Table 7.
As shown in Table 7, only 23% of the escalated
projects were considered to be completed and
successful, whereas 84% of the non-escalated
projects were judged to be completed and
successful (Chi-square p < .001).  Moreover, all of
the negative outcome categories were higher for
escalated projects than for non-escalated
projects.
Perceived Budget/Schedule Performance
The survey data indicate that escalated projects
were not only more likely to be perceived as late
and over budget; but that the amount (i.e., the
percentage) by which they were perceived to
exceed their schedules and budgets was much
greater than that exhibited by non-escalated
projects.  More than 82% of the projects that
escalated were perceived to have exceeded their
budgets, whereas only 48% of the non-escalation
projects were perceived to have exceeded their
budgets.  In addition, 91% of the projects that
escalated were perceived to have exceeded their
original schedule as compared with 58% of the
non-escalation projects.  Table 8 shows the
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degree to which escalated and non-escalated
projects were perceived to exceed their schedule
and budget targets when overruns did occur.  
Notice that the differences between escalated and
non-escalated projects are significant at the .001
level on both dimensions.  Table 8 is also con-
sistent with the notion that budgets and schedules
for software projects are frequently underesti-
mated; even the non-escalated projects (which
were defined as ones that progressed smoothly
enough that continuation was never questioned)
showed an 18% overrun on budget and a 22%
overrun on schedule.
To summarize, projects that escalate are
perceived to be significantly different (from non-
escalated projects) in terms of both implemen-
tation and budget/schedule performance.  This
does not mean, however, that all cases of esca-
lation are doomed to perform poorly, nor does it
mean that all non-escalated projects perform well.
It simply means that escalated projects are signi-
ficantly more likely to have performance problems.
This finding contributes to prior research by
showing that escalated projects exhibit signifi-
cantly worse performance than non-escalated
projects.
Using Theory-Based Models to
Distinguish Escalation from
Non-Escalation
Our third research question was whether con-
structs associated with the four theories of
escalation could be used to create models
capable of distinguishing between projects that
escalate and those that do not.  Here, we present
the results of four separate logistic regression
models, one for each theory, designed to test
whether the theoretically derived constructs asso-
ciated could be used to distinguish between
projects that escalated and those that did not.
A hierarchical method of analysis was used to
develop and then compare models using logistic
regression.  Logistic regression analysis was
chosen over discriminant analysis, because we
are dealing with a dichotomous dependent
variable, and non-parametric type independent
variables with non-normal distributions.  The
dependent variable was whether the project was
escalated (1) or non-escalated (0).  Each inde-
pendent variable was whether a condition was
present in the project (1) or not present (0).
Logistic regression uses a non-parametric model
and, therefore, does not require variables to be
normally distributed.
Controlling for Exogenous Variables.
Demographic variables, such as organization and
IS department size, auditor experience, and
project size, can potentially impact escalation.
The sample was segmented using each of these
variables but no significant differences were found
across escalated and non-escalated projects,
except for project size.
Project size, therefore, was used as an exogenous
variable in the analysis.  As shown in Appendix B,
respondents indicated the relative size of the
project on a Likert scale, which ranged from 0
(smaller in size compared to other IS projects
undertaken) to 6 (larger in size compared to other
IS projects undertaken).  Size was included to
examine if larger projects were more vulnerable to
escalation.  A normalized measure of project size
was computed by dividing indicated responses by
six.
Logistic Regression Results
Our first step was to take the constructs from each
theory and create a model with only those
constructs and project size.  Each model was then
evaluated as to the significance of the model
(using 75% of the original sample) and the
importance of each construct within the model.
Finally, the other 25% of the original sample was
used to determine how useful each model was in
classifying new projects.  In logistic regression,
several measures of model significance can be
used.  Table 9 shows all the measures for each of
our models based on different escalation theories
and project size. Appendix C provides an explana-
tion of relevant statistics used for interpreting
logistic regression results.
According to the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-
fit test, all the models were significantly better at
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Table 9.  Analysis of Project Escalation Behavior Results for Model Fit
Logistic Model Derived
from Constructs
Associated with 
-2 Log
Likelihood
Cox &
Snell R2 Nagelkerke R2
Hosmer-Lemeshow
Goodness-of-fit
(chi-square, p <)
Self Justification Theory 252.55 .09 .13 (3.20, .92)
Prospect Theory 241.52 .12 .18 (3.39, .85)
Agency Theory 209.93 .23 .32 (11.29, .19)
Approach Avoidance
Theory
209.10 .26 .37 (2.03, .98)
determining the probability of project escalation
than random chance.  Two of the models, how-
ever, outperformed the others.  The two strongest
models were those based on constructs derived
from agency theory and approach avoidance
theory.  These models equally reduced the sum of
squared error (lower -2 Log Likelihood) and had
comparable R2 values.  Of the two, the one
derived from approach avoidance theory was
marginally better.  To continue the assessment of
each model, Table 10 presents several measures
describing the importance of constructs within
each model.
The significance of a construct was assessed by
examining the p-value of the Wald statistic (which
measures significance of the construct after
accounting for its error) and the 95% Confidence
Interval Odds Ratio (if the interval does not con-
tain the number one, then the item is significant).
For example: the constructs based on the different
theories were all significant except psychological
self-justification.  Except for psychological self-
justification, all constructs had Wald p-values less
than .05 and their Confidence Interval Odds
Ratios did not include one.
The degree to which a construct was useful for
distinguishing project escalation was determined
by examining the standardized Betas (SE Beta)
and the Odds Ratios.  The odds ratio is the
increase in likelihood in project escalation corres-
ponding to an increase in an independent vari-
able.  In the model based on self-justification, the
project size standardized beta was higher than
either psychological or social self-justification.
Moreover, the odds ratio for project size was
higher than psychological self-justification and
similar to social self-justification (approximately
three-fold increase in project escalation when
social self-justification is present or project size
increases).
In the model based on prospect theory, project
size was more important than the sunk cost effect
in both the standardized betas and the odds ratio
(4.96-fold increase and 4.17-fold increase,
respectively).
For the model based on constructs derived from
agency theory, project size had the strongest
standardized beta but the weakest odds ratio.
Information asymmetry had the weakest stan-
dardized beta and the strongest odds ratio (seven-
fold increase in project escalation when informa-
tion asymmetry is present).  Goal congruency was
in the middle on both measures of importance.
In the model based on the construct derived from
approach avoidance theory, project size had a
stronger standardized beta but completion effect
had by far the largest odds ratio (21-fold increase
in project escalation when completion effect is
present!).
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Table 10.  Analysis of Project Escalation Behavior Significance Results
for Each Construct
Models Beta
SE
(Beta)
Odds
Ratio
95% CI
Odds
Ratio Wald p <
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Self Justification Theory 
Project Size 1.21 .56 3.36 (1.11,10
.13)
4.63 .032
Psychological Self-Justification .14 .45 1.15 (.48,
2.76)
.10 .753
Social Self-Justification 1.27 .44 3.57 (1.52,
8.40)
8.50 .004
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Prospect Theory 
Project Size 1.60 .57 4.96 (1.62,
15.20)
7.87 .005
Sunk Cost Effect 1.43 .35 4.17 (2.11,
8.21)
17.00 .001
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Agency Theory
Project Size 1.22 .62 3.39 (1.00,
11.51)
3.85 .05
Goal Congruency 1.30 .59 3.65 (1.16,
11.50)
4.90 .027
Information Asymmetry 1.98 .54 7.28 (2.51,
21.08)
13.38 .001
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Approach Avoidance
Theory
Project Size 1.77 .64 5.88 (1.67,
20.70)
7.62 .006
Completion Effect 3.06 .47 21.34 (8.06,
53.81)
42.05 .001
Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed earlier, the auditors played different
roles in assessing the project and became
involved with the project at different phases. We
conducted two sets of sensitivity tests to ascertain
if the observed pattern of relationships between
each set of theoretical constructs and project
escalation was stable across auditor role or phase
when s/he became involved. In the first set of
sensitivity tests, we examined the stability of
observed relationships with respect to role played
by the auditor. Subjects who participated as a
project manager, served as a member of the
development team, or audited the project on a
regular basis were placed in one group. Subjects
who evaluated the project on a less frequent basis
or who played some other role in the project were
placed in a second group.  The pattern of results
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observed in our logistic regressions for each of the
theories was the same across the two groups of
auditor roles. 
In the second set of sensitivity tests, we examined
the stability of observed relationships with respect
to the phase when the auditor became involved
with the project. Subjects who became involved
during planning or requirements analysis were
placed in one group; subjects who became
involved during later phases of the development
process were placed in a second group. The
pattern of results observed in our logistic
regressions for each of the theories was the same
across the two groups, as defined by the phase at
which the auditor became involved with the pro-
ject.  The sensitivity analysis provides support for
the pooling of our data across roles played by the
auditors and the phase in the project when they
became involved. Furthermore, these results
provide additional evidence for the pattern of
relationships identified above using the entire
sample.
Predictive Validity:  How Well Does Each Model
Classify New Projects?
To assess the predictive validity of each model, we
examined its classification performance on both
the estimation sample and a separate holdout
sample.  As a base of comparison, we computed
the Morrison's (1969) proportional chance criterion
given by the model:
C = alpha2 + (1-alpha)2
where alpha is the proportion of projects in group
1 and (1-alpha) is the proportion of projects in
group 2.  In our study, group 1 was escalated pro-
jects (approximately 73%) and group 2 was non-
escalated projects (27%).  For our sample, Morri-
son's chance criterion (i.e., the overall percentage
correct expected by chance) is .59.  Accordingly,
we used a cutoff estimated probability of 0.59 to
determine membership in a given group according
to chance.
Table 11 shows the classification results that were
obtained for both the estimation sample and the
holdout sample.  Chi-square tests indicated that all
four logistic regression models performed better
than chance in terms of their classification ability
for both the estimation and holdout samples.
The model derived from approach avoidance
theory, however, had the strongest results.  Based
on the completion effect construct and project
size, it correctly classified over 70% of both
escalated and non-escalated projects.  As this per-
formance level is consistent across the estimation
and holdout samples, we have strong evidence of
the validity of completion effect predicting project
escalation.  The model based on constructs
derived from agency theory also performs well in
classifying both escalated and non-escalated
projects, although its predictive performance drops
off somewhat in the holdout sample.  Interestingly,
the models based on constructs derived from self-
justification theory and from prospect theory both
perform well in classifying escalated projects (for
both the estimation and the holdout samples), but
are relatively poor in classifying non-escalated
projects.  In summary, constructs derived from
approach avoidance theory and agency theory
perform well in classifying both escalated and non-
escalated projects.  On the other hand, constructs
derived from self-justification theory and prospect
theory perform well in classifying escalated pro-
jects, but do not perform well in their classification
of non-escalated projects.
Limitations of the Study
Before discussing the implications of our work, it is
appropriate to mention its limitations.  This study
relied on IS audit and control professionals as
subjects and involved self-reported information
concerning projects that had been completed
some time earlier.  What is more, the auditors in
our study were asked to furnish opinions regarding
the motivation and intentions of the key decision
maker on a project. These factors raise the pros-
pect of a possible bias or a significant amount of
error in our data set and thus our conclusions
must be interpreted with some caution.
As an example of possible bias, it is conceivable
that auditors are more likely to be assigned to
troubled projects and that their estimates of the
frequency of project escalation may, therefore,
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Table 11.  Results of Logistic Regression Models:  Classification Analysis
Estimation Sample ( n = 242) Holdout Sample (n = 80)
Models
Escalated
(%) 
Non-
escalated
(%)
Overall
(%)
Escalated
(%)
Non-
escalated
(%)
Overall
(%)
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Self Justification
Theory
84.34 40 71.86 87.04 42.86 74.56
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Prospect Theory
85.09 36.92 71.24 82.69 38.1 69.86
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Agency Theory
78.43 72.31 76.61 68.36 60 66.20
Model Based on Constructs
Related to Approach
Avoidance Theory
77.25 71.21 75.54 72.22 80.95 74.67
contain an upward biasing.  However, this is not
necessarily the case.  It is conceivable that IS
auditors tend to be employed more commonly by
organizations that are more cognizant of the need
for good software project management. Firms
employing IS auditors might, therefore, have a
lower incidence of software project escalation.  By
this logic, it is possible that the choice of IS
auditors may have introduced a downward biasing
in our estimates of the frequency of project esca-
lation.  While the choice of auditors as subjects
certainly creates the possibility of an upward or
downward bias in our estimates, there were
several advantages of relying on IS auditors that
outweighed these concerns.  These include:
(1) IS auditors do not have directly vested
interests in project outcomes because their
careers are unlikely to be made or broken by a
projects success or failure, (2) IS auditors can be
expected to report more objectively than
managers and other project participants, (3) IS
auditors have access to objective data on project
performance, and (4) IS auditors have experience
with multiple projects and formal standards for
judging projects.
It is possible that auditors may not have sufficient
information to provide knowledgeable responses
to questions concerning the motivations and
intentions of other actors.  Our data, however,
suggest that the auditors tended to have an early
and relatively high level of involvement in the
projects they reported on, suggesting that they
were in a position to respond accurately to the
questions we posed.
Another limitation is that our research is based on
the input of a single respondent for each case
studied and is subject to methods bias.  Having
the same subjects rate both project performance
as well as behavioral factors may have led to
percept-percept inflation, although the literature
suggests that such effects may be smaller and
less widespread than previously believed (Cramp-
ton and Wagner 1994).  By asking respondents to
retrospectively characterize troubled vs. less
troubled projects, there is also the possibility that
respondents imputed the presence of escalation
factors onto troubled projects.  A one-way ANOVA
on all of the escalation-related variables, however,
revealed a half-dozen variables where there was
no significant mean difference between the
escalated and non-escalated projects.  The fact
that there was some selectivity in the negative
factors associated with escalated vs. non-
escalated projects suggests that the methods bias
threat is minimal in this study.
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The reliability of the data might have been im-
proved had we been able to gather data on
individual projects from multiple subjects.  Such
an approach was not feasible, however, in this
study.  Further, it will be recalled that one of the
reasons we chose IS auditors is that we believed
they would provide a more unbiased view than
other project participants.  So, while multiple
respondents are generally desirable, it remains
unclear whether such an approach would lead to
more reliable data in a study context such as this
one.  Another potential problem involves the issue
of recall bias.  Since our study relied on self-
reported information concerning past events, our
data is subject to possible recall bias.  Short of
conducting a prospective study of escalation, we
know of no good mechanism to avoid the problem
of subject recall.  
Finally, we must note that the operationalization
and measurement of escalation-related constructs
was challenging and, in some ways, problematic.
In the case of prospect theory and the sunk cost
effect, we were constrained to the use of a single
item measure in our analysis.  In addition, our
measurement items used to operationalize con-
structs associated with the four theories of escala-
tion required subjects to make subjective assess-
ments of the attitudes and behaviors exhibited by
the key decision maker associated with a project.
In some cases, the theories and some of their
associated constructs proved difficult to opera-
tionalize in the form of one or more questionnaire
items.  The concept of psychological self-justifi-
cation serves as an example.  Clearly, feelings of
personal responsibility, judged to be an essential
element of psychological self-justification, are
difficult to assess through a third party.  To create
measurement items designed to assess the need
for psychological self-justification, we, therefore,
turned to factors that can give rise to (or be
indicative of) a heightened sense of personal
responsibility.  As an example, repeated expres-
sions of support for a project, extensive involve-
ment or initiation of a project, and emotional
attachment to a project may all be suggestive of a
heightened sense of personal responsibility.  Any
of these conditions can thus be expected to
induce psychological self-justification in the
presence of negative feedback.
Perhaps as a consequence of the operation-
alization issue just discussed, it should come as
no great surprise that psychological self-justi-
fication was not a useful discriminator between
projects that escalated and those that did not.
Because we were unable to measure psycho-
logical self-justification directly, our opera-
tionalization focused upon attitudes and behaviors
that might just as reasonably be displayed in the
context of non-escalating projects, as they would
be expected to appear in the context of escalating
projects.  Therefore, the results of our study
should certainly not be interpreted to mean that
SJT is not a potent theory, but rather that, as
operationalized in this study, the concept of
psychological self-justification does not allow us to
predict which projects will escalate and which
ones will not.  Further, it should be noted that in
drawing upon the four theories of escalation for
development of our models, we have selectively
chosen to emphasize certain constructs that we
believe are central to the theories, while omitting
other constructs that may also be important.  For
example, in the case of approach avoidance, we
chose to emphasize the completion effect con-
struct and did not operationalize other constructs
associated with the theory.  Therefore, it would be
misleading to construe our work here as proving
that one theory of escalation is superior to
another.  This is certainly not our intent.  With that
being said, we believe that our work does show
the value of using theoretically derived constructs
to develop and test models capable of discri-
minating between projects that escalate and those
that do not. 
Implications for Research
The results of our study contribute to existing
research in several important ways.  First, the
study provides evidence that escalation is a
relatively frequent problem and that escalated pro-
jects exhibit markedly worse performance than
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projects that do not escalate.  Second, the study
reveals that variables derived from various esca-
lation theories can be used to distinguish between
projects that escalate and those that do not.  By
operationalizing certain constructs associated with
self-justification theory (SJT), prospect theory
(PT), agency theory (AT), and approach avoid-
ance theory (AAT), and examining their influence
on escalation across a large sample of projects,
we have shown that elements of all four theories
seem to have some predictive validity.  This, in
itself, represents a contribution to research
because it suggests that the theories that have
been invoked to explain the escalation pheno-
menon are not mutually exclusive.  Rather than
viewing them as alternative theories, as they are
frequently portrayed in the escalation literature,
they should perhaps be viewed as complemen-
tary.  Future research should attempt to combine
elements of these theories to create a richer
theory of this complex phenomenon.  Our findings
suggest that escalation is a complex phenomenon
and that more sophisticated models are needed to
explain escalation behavior.  
While constructs derived from all four theories
were significant in logistic regression models, the
completion effect construct derived from approach
avoidance theory seemed to be best at discri-
minating between escalated and non-escalated
projects.  The model derived from agency theory
constructs seemed to also provide good classi-
fication, but exhibited a decrease in prediction
capability on the holdout sample, as compared to
the estimation sample.  The sunk cost effect con-
struct provided relatively good classification of
escalated projects, but was relatively poor at clas-
sifying non-escalated projects.  In some measure,
this may be seen to corroborate previous research
(Conlon and Garland 1993) suggesting that the
completion effect dominates the sunk cost effect
in terms of explaining escalation behavior.  From
a measurement standpoint, however, we found it
difficult to construct measures of sunk cost and
completion that did not correlate highly with one
another.  This suggests that subjects may be
inferring sunk cost information from completion
information and vice versa.  If the completion
effect of approach avoidance theory overlaps with
the sunk cost effect of prospect theory (and this
would explain the relatively high inter-correlation
between the two scales), then further research is
needed to fully understand the relationship
between the two theories.
Implications for Practice
Some practitioners may be inclined to believe that
project escalation is a rare event (Glass 1997).
This study suggests otherwise.  Managers should
be aware that the incidence of project escalation
is relatively high and that the outcomes associated
with such projects tend to be markedly worse than
projects that do not escalate.  The models deve-
loped here may help managers to identify and
prevent escalation.  Since constructs derived from
all four theories were significant in logistic
regression models, managers should consider
their implications for practice.  The results ob-
tained using the model derived from agency
theory constructs, for example, underscore the
importance of good communication and moni-
toring of projects to avoid the condition of informa-
tion asymmetry.  To minimize the problems asso-
ciated with escalation, managers would do well to
implement early warning systems aimed at
detecting escalation as early as possible.  One
way to minimize budget and schedule escalation
is to define the de-escalation trigger points at the
outset of the project.  In this way, when the cost
and schedule begin to approach the predefined
trigger points, managers can take steps to de-
escalate the project and contain the damage.
Another related tactic is defining termination con-
ditions at the outset of the project.  Finally, mana-
gers can embrace one or more of the models
presented here and tailor it to their own
environment.
The best model developed in this paper classified
77% of the escalated projects and 71% of the
non-escalated projects correctly.  Practicing
managers should consider using and refining this
model as an aid in reviewing their software project
portfolios.  If the goal is to reduce the prevalence
of escalated projects, it should be noted that some
of the other models we tested provided marginally
better classification of escalated projects
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however, they provided significantly poorer classi-
fication of non-escalated projects. The problems
of incorrectly classifying a non-escalating project
as escalating and incorrectly classifying an esca-
lating project as non-escalating may be consi-
dered in terms of type 1 and type 2 errors.  It is
important that managers understand the tradeoff
associated with minimizing type 2 errors at the
expense of generating type 1 errors and vice
versa.   To illustrate this, consider the following
example.
Suppose an organization has made a policy
decision that projects undergoing possible esca-
lation are to be avoided at all costs (i.e., to
minimize type 2 errors).  If there is any evidence
that a project is possibly escalating, the project is
terminated and the resources transferred to other
uses.  Minimizing type 2 errors has important
ramifications for the organization that pursues
such a strategy.  First, it is critical to understand
that in making this policy decision, the organi-
zation has also (perhaps unknowingly) created an
associated policy that it is acceptable to prema-
turely cancel projects that are non-escalating and
which may have eventually yielded benefits to the
organization (i.e., a type 1 error).  However, this
second policy decision is a natural by-product of
the decision to minimize type 2 errors.  Further-
more, by minimizing type 2 errors, organizations
will never experience escalation and will, there-
fore, never learn how to recognize and manage
such problems if and when they do occur.
The alternative situation to consider occurs when
an organization makes a policy decision that
projects are not canceled until there is sufficient
evidence that the project is no longer worthwhile.
In doing so, however, the organization has also
made a decision (again, possibly without realizing
it) that some escalation (type 2 errors) is an
acceptable tradeoff in striving to avoid type 1
errors.  This tradeoff between type 1 and type 2
errors has strategic implications. Companies gain
or maintain competitive advantage for a number of
reasons, including their information technology.
Thus an organization that chooses to avoid
escalation at all costs may also be choosing,
perhaps not deliberately, to potentially forego
some software projects that could provide com-
petitive advantage.  On the other hand, allowing
too many cases of escalation to be continued on
the grounds that the project may be incorrectly
classified will drain valuable resources from the
organization that could have been used for other
purposes.  Managers should therefore consider
their organizations strategy and culture in deter-
mining an appropriate balance between type 1
and type 2 errors.  By developing and applying
tools such as the models presented here, it is
hoped that IS management will be able to strike
an appropriate balance between obtaining and
removing commitment on projects.
Summary and Conclusions
The IS literature contains several case studies of
projects that have undergone escalation and were
ultimately judged to be failures (e.g., Drummond
1996; Keil 1995), but the prevalence of this
phenomenon and the outcomes generally asso-
ciated with such projects have not been previously
established.  This studythe first large-scale field
survey on software project escalationsuggests
that between 30% and 40% of all software pro-
jects exhibit some degree of escalation.  The
results of the study also indicate that escalated
projects have significantly more performance
problems than projects that do not escalate.  
In building models capable of distinguishing
escalated from non-escalated projects, we found
that the completion effect increased the chances
of project escalation by 21 times and that the
constructs associated with agency theory infor-
mation asymmetry and goal incongruence)
increased the chances of project escalation by
seven times and 3.6 times, respectively.  The
results reported here have significant implications
for both research and practice because they sug-
gest that cases of escalation can be identified with
a high probability simply by examining the pre-
sence of certain behavioral factors.  It should be
noted that these behavioral factors appear to pro-
vide substantially more useful information about
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the probability of project escalation than traditional
structural variables, such as project size.  
To summarize, one of the primary contributions of
this study is the evidence that it provides con-
cerning both the prevalence and seriousness of
software project escalation.  This research also
represents an initial step toward providing a
theory-based approach for managing the problem.
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Appendix A
Survey Instructions for Selection of Escalated
and Non-Escalated Projects
For the escalation survey, the specific wording used was:  
This part of the survey is designed to collect information on your experience with a
specific case of project escalation. 
Instructions 
Please select a troubled project (abandoned or completed) which continued to receive
resources [i.e. time, money] even though the project should have been discontinued or
redirected.  If you have never seen or been associated with a case of project escalation,
please skip to Section 2 on the last page of the survey.
For the non-escalation survey, the specific wording used on the survey was:
This form is designed to collect information on your experience with a project that did
not escalate. 
Instructions 
Please select a completed project which progressed smoothly enough that you never
thought it should be discontinued or redirected.  If you have never been associated with
a project that did not escalate, please skip to Section 2 on the last page of the survey.
When respondents reached the portion of the survey pertaining to escalation factors they were given the
following instructions:
Here we are interested in the degree to which behavioral reasons might influence a
decision maker to continue a project.
Subjects were then instructed to mark the Yes or No box to indicate whether the behavioral factor was
present or not and to check Dont Know if you feel you dont have enough knowledge of the situation
to respond.  The phrase Primary Decision Maker(s) which appears in the questionnaire items (see
Appendix B) was defined as referring to the person(s) responsible for the decision to continue the project.
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Appendix B
Scale Items and Descriptive Statistics by Construct
Which of the following problems were present in this project?
Need for Psychological Self-Justification
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Item Wording5
PSJ_1 .860 .347 The Primary Decision Maker(s) repeatedly expressed support
for the project
PSJ_2 .712 .453 The Primary Decision Maker(s) initiated the project or was
extensively involved with it
PSJ_3 .387 .488 The Primary Decision Maker(s) seemed to be emotionally
attached to this project
Need for Social Self-Justification
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Item Wording
SSJ_1 .687 .464 Abandonment of the project would make the Primary Decision
Maker(s) look bad to others
SSJ_2 .395 .489 People inside or outside the organization viewed this project
as the Primary Decision Maker(s)s baby
Sunk Cost Effect
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Item Wording
SC_1 .408 .492 The Primary Decision Maker(s) referred to past investments in
this project as a reason to continue
SC_2 .423 .494 The Primary Decision Maker(s) used the attitude there was
too much invested to quit to justify continuing the project
Goal Incongruency
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Item Wording
GI_1 .356 .479 The Primary Decision Maker(s) acted out of self-interest rather
than the interests of the organization when continuing the
project
GI_2 .395 .489 The Primary Decision Maker(s) operated in an environment
where bad news gets you killed
GI_3 .510 .501 Association with an unsuccessful project would have an
adverse effect on the Primary Decision Maker(s) chance for
advancement in the organization
aThe items that follow all contain the ph\rase Primary Decision Maker(s).  The instructions on the survey indicated that
The phrase Primary Decision Maker(s) refers to the person(s) responsible for the decision to continue the project.
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Information Asymmetry
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Item Wording
IA_1 .392 .489 The Primary Decision Maker(s) concealed negative
information from top management
IA_2 .439 .496 The Primary Decision Maker(s) distorted negative information
when reporting to upper management
IA_3 .542 .499 The Primary Decision Maker(s) put a positive spin on any
negative project information when reporting to upper
management
Completion Effect
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Item Wording
C_1 .560 .497 The Primary Decision Maker(s) exhibited the attitude we have
come too far to quit now as a rationale for continuing the
project
C_2 .438 .497 The Primary Decision Maker(s) exhibited the attitude we are
so close to the end of the project, we should keep going
Project Size
Compared to other IS projects undertaken in your organization, was this project...
Smaller 
(in size)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Larger 
(in size)
Mean response to project size:  4.124; Standard deviation: 1.656
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Appendix C
Explanation of Relevant Statistics for Interpreting
Logistic Regression Results
Statistic Explanation
Cox & Snell R2 R2 = 1 - [L(0)/L(b)]2/n
Where L(0) is the likelihood of the intercepts-only model, L(b) is the
likelihood of the specified model, and n is the sample size.  This
measure achieves a maximum of less than 1 for discrete models, with
maximum given by
R2 max = 1 - [L(0)]2/n
Nagelkerke R2 This adjusted R2 measure differs from the Cox & Snell R2 in that it can
achieve a maximum value of 1.   
R2 adj  =  R2/ R2 max 
Wald statistic The statistic is obtained by dividing the maximum likelihood estimate
of the slope parameter by its standard error estimate.  The resulting
ratio, under the hypothesis that the coefficient of the slope parameter
is zero, follows a standard normal distribution.  
Odds ratio This is a measure of association between the dependent variable and
the independent variable. It represents how much more likely it is for
the outcome to be present among those with presence of a certain
condition. 
-2 Log Likelihood Assesses the significance of independent variables in the model in
terms of their ability to reduce the sum of squared errors.  The statistic
follows a chi-square distribution.  
Hosmer-Lemeshow
statistic for goodness-of-fit
Cases are grouped into g groups based on values of estimated
probabilities.  Groups contain all subjects with estimated probabilities
between adjacent cut-off points.  The Hoshmer-Lemeshow goodness-
of-fit statistic is obtained by calculating the Pearson chi-square
statistic from the 2xg table of observed and estimated expected
frequencies.
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